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The euro now has fifteen years of history. Spain’s participation in the most advanced 
European integration project has been one of the most important determinants of its recent 
economic trajectory. To mark the anniversary, this article analyses the influence of ECB 
action on the Spanish economy during its fifteen years of existence, a period that saw the 
euro area itself transition from a prolonged initial stage of growth and stability to a far-
reaching crisis that has thrown into relief its fragilities and inefficiencies and even called 
into question the viability of the project, as initially conceived.
The Spanish economy was among those that benefited most from the expansionary 
effects of the creation of the euro, but also among those that suffered most severely from 
the imbalances that built up. Eventually finding itself facing the necessity of making 
significant adjustments in a markedly adverse situation, Spain belongs to the group of 
countries that have suffered the greatest tensions and costs as a result of the crisis of the 
common currency. When analysing the influence of ECB action on the Spanish economy, 
it is therefore logical to distinguish between what happened in the period before the crisis 
and the events that have marked the development of the crisis. The structure of this article 
reflects this distinction.
The influence of ECB action on the Spanish economy, before the crisis revealed the 
mounting imbalances and vulnerabilities, was marked by the huge step that joining the 
euro entailed for the modernisation and galvanisation of the economy.
The change of macroeconomic regime resulting from membership of an area of monetary 
stability unleashed potent expansionary forces that were conducive to major gains in the 
process of catching up with the levels of welfare of the most advanced European countries. 
The adoption of the single monetary policy and the transfer of sovereignty in this area to 
the ECB were the most successful steps on the long path towards European standards of 
progress and stability for the Spanish economy: a goal formally pursued by economic 
policy since the late 1950s, although efforts had been repeatedly frustrated by the 
numerous structural, institutional and political constraints affecting the Spanish economy. 
There is an abundant literature and a barely discussed consensus regarding the great 
achievement that participation in Stage Three of EMU from the outset represented. 
Distinguishing the proportion of these beneficial effects that is attributable to ECB action 
from the proportion that must be considered to stem from the far-reaching structural 
change to which numerous actors and factors contributed is not easy. However, there is 
no doubt that these expansionary impulses could not have materialised without the anti-
inflationary credibility that the ECB’s monetary policy had from the very start. In the 
absence of this credibility such a drastic change in interest-rate expectations as that which 
occurred in Spain would not have been possible in an economy with such deep-rooted 
inflationary tendencies. Through the traditional substitution, income and wealth effects, 
this change in expectations acted as a powerful engine boosting demand and activity. On 
the credit side of the impact of ECB action is the significant contribution of its monetary 
policy to the major gains made by the Spanish economy in the process of real convergence 
between 1998 and 2007.
Introduction
The influence of the ECB 
on the Spanish economy 
before the crisis
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Throughout this stage, however, the monetary policy stance was predominantly 
expansionary. This was a consequence of the difficult digestion of German unification in 
the very heart of the euro area and the looseness of global financial conditions during the 
“Great Moderation” which, as subsequent events have dramatically shown, led to a serious 
underestimation of risks and significant real-estate and financial bubbles in the industrialised 
countries. This expansionary stance was especially inappropriate for the needs of the 
Spanish economy, which had not fully converged with European levels of stability and 
faced a particularly strong stimulus as a consequence of the aforementioned change in 
interest rate expectations. Sufficient illustration of this is provided by the behaviour of the 
long-term-interest-rate spread vis-à-vis Germany between 1995 and 2005 and a 
comparison of the interest rates set by the ECB between 1999 and 2005 with the rates that 
would have been consistent with the specific requirements of the Spanish economy 
according to the Taylor Rule. Such monetary looseness led to a veritable explosion of 
lending to the private sector, which was channelled mostly towards construction and real-
estate activities, these being the most sensitive to long-term interest rates, with a resulting 
expansion in bank balance sheets and increase in risk incurred (see Chart 1).
Membership of the euro area meant not only giving up the exchange rate as a tool of 
economic policy, but also the loss of control over the behaviour of lending to the domestic 
economy. The ECB’s monetary policy set the determinants of lending growth at the area 
level, but the distribution of this growth among the various member counties remained in 
the hands of financial intermediaries, through their relations with the end-users of financing.
During the long expansion that followed the introduction of the euro, the looseness of 
monetary conditions was one of the determinants of the build-up of serious imbalances in 
the Spanish economy, in the form of high levels of debt, real-estate excesses, 
competitiveness losses and external deficit. The free movement of liquidity and financing 
within the integrated monetary area enabled larger external imbalances to be financed, 
that would not have been possible when each country had had its own currency, and led 
to the warning signs implicit in the large size of the external deficit being largely ignored. 
In fact, the 2005 issue of the Annual Report of the Banco de España had already pointed 
out that “the growing net borrowing of the nation is indicative of a pattern of growth that 
cannot be sustained indefinitely” [Banco de España (2006)], in line with the analysis 
according to which the relief of the external financial constraint within a monetary union 
has the negative corollary of “weakening one of the most effective mechanisms, that 
analysts and economic policy managers are most accustomed to, for stopping and 
channelling excessive spending growth” [Malo de Molina (2007)]. Accordingly, “the 
deterioration in competitiveness underlying the external balance and the increase in 
private sector debt […] may affect both the financial stability of the various agents and 
sectors and the sustainability of spending and growth” [Malo de Molina (2006)].
Even so, one thing is the undeniable influence that the looseness of the monetary conditions 
set by the ECB had on the build-up of imbalances in the Spanish economy. Quite another 
is to place the responsibility for them on the debit side of the ECB’s account, for two 
important reasons: first, because belonging to a monetary union involves accepting that 
monetary conditions have to be aligned with the requirements of the area as a whole and 
that the other economic policies that remain under national sovereignty must play the role 
of offsetting any misalignment between the common monetary policy stance and specific 
national requirements. In the case of Spain, a more countercyclical fiscal policy was 
needed to guarantee the sustainability of public finances, which was threatened by the 
weakness of the institutional framework to secure fiscal discipline in a highly decentralised 
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state and by the vulnerability of the pay-as-you-go public pension system in the face of an 
ageing population. Likewise, deeper changes to the institutional structure and market 
organisation should have been implemented, to make the economy more flexible and to 
strengthen the mechanism of adjustment through costs, margins and prices, counteing 
the predominance of adjustment through quantities (output and employment).
It is obvious with the benefit of hindsight that the economy had not sufficiently adapted to 
the requirements of EMU and that the euphoria generated by rapid growth led to a 
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relaxation of the efforts still needed for the economy to be able to live with the monetary 
conditions of countries with a deeper rooted tradition of stability and greater productive 
potential. Indeed, financial policy measures were even adopted to ensure that the loose 
financial conditions should reach private agents as quickly and as intensely as possible. 
This was the case, for example, of the boost given to variable rate loans, which was 
intended to accelerate the transmission of ECB rates.
That said, it would not be correct to attribute the whole responsibility for the imbalances 
to the failings of the economic policy pursued by Spain since it joined the euro area. There 
is a second, equally powerful reason, originating in specific failures in the design and 
governance of EMU, which were conducive to a lack of surveillance of the development of 
imbalances within the euro area and failure to prepare for a systemic crisis like the one that 
eventually emerged. Monetary union was, of course, not conceived of as the final 
destination, but only as a stop on the way. The founders themselves, aware that the single 
currency did not meet some of the requirements for an “optimum currency area”, hoped 
that the project would continue to advance towards more ambitious goals of integration in 
other areas apart from the purely monetary. Unfortunately, this expectation was not fulfilled 
because it was based on two assumptions that proved to be over-ingenuous. Supposedly 
efficient markets were expected to raise risk premiums and make financing more difficult 
for countries that failed to maintain a certain level of stability or to make sufficient progress 
with the structural transformation still needed for the country to be able to survive inside a 
strong currency area. It was thought that the ability of markets to discriminate would 
trigger the appropriate adjustments and responses. Also, governments were expected to 
be capable of reacting in time to risks of divergence that might jeopardise competitiveness, 
growth and employment. And this was expected both of the governments of countries 
with potential problems of overheating and imbalances and of the European authorities, 
who were expected to monitor and identify in time the emergence of internal tensions and 
to sustain the political pressure for integration.
None of this happened. The markets generously financed countries with imbalances, 
as if they were as solvent as the most stable countries in the area. Some governments, as 
already mentioned in the case of Spain, occasionally mistook the exuberance for an 
improvement in the fundamentals of their economies. And the EU authorities were 
paralysed by a nationalist backlash. Instead of making headway with integration, 
budget and balance of payments deficits and large amounts of public and private debt 
were allowed to build up in some countries, which eventually led to a systemic crisis 
that, within a very short time, undid much of the progress that had been made on 
integration. 
All this ended up revealing that the foundations of the ECB’s single monetary policy were 
insufficiently solid to resist the severe blows dealt by the crisis, which meant that the 
precarious institutional architecture of the single currency had to be reviewed wholesale 
while the ECB’s responsibility to ensure the stability of its currency within the strict margins 
of action defined by the founding treaties was stretched to the limit. The ECB was forced 
to be unusually innovative in order to make sure that the pace of institutional reform of 
EMU kept up with the development of the crisis.
The second part of this article analyses the impact on the Spanish economy of the action 
taken by the ECB in the exceptional circumstances of the crisis, in which significant 
financial instability, markedly adverse cyclical factors and serious shortcomings of 
economic governance have all played a part.
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The ECB’s reaction to the first symptoms of crisis was to deploy the usual liquidity providing 
mechanisms to accommodate the surge in the demand for liquidity stemming from the rise 
in uncertainty and risk aversion triggered by the US subprime mortgage crisis. To 
accommodate this demand, the ECB refrained from its usual practice of calibrating its 
provision of liquidity to the needs considered compatible with the stance it wishes to give 
to its monetary policy. Also additional tenders were introduced for three-month liquidity, 
the longest maturity that had been available at ECB tenders, and the first tenders of six-
month liquidity were conducted in order to increase certainty regarding future access to 
basic liquidity, at a time when mistrust between counterparties had brought the interbank 
market to a standstill. These actions were hailed as proof of sensitivity, helping to reduce 
uncertainty and limit the spread of US tensions to Europe. A significant innovation 
consisted of the agreements reached between the world’s main central banks, which 
enabled the ECB to offer dollar liquidity to euro area banks. This possibility was very 
important for some European countries with banks exposed to the subprime crisis and 
suffering from a serious dollar shortage, although Spain was not among them. The Spanish 
economy entered a phase of cyclical downturn and unwinding of imbalances. The 
coincidence of this first episode of financial instability with a cyclical turning point 
intensified the slowdown in demand and exacerbated the real estate correction. In any 
event, the tranquillity supplied by the accommodation of the demand for liquidity by the 
ECB was conducive to the significant adjustments that needed to take place.
The first reaction of the ECB was limited to relaxing the terms on which it supplied liquidity, 
while the interest rates on its main refinancing transactions were left unchanged at 4%. In 
an economy like the Spanish one (in which lending to the private sector was still growing at 
rates of around 20%, domestic demand was growing by more than 4% and the correction 
of the housing overvaluation had still to begin), this level of central bank financing costs was 
conducive to the rebalancing that the Spanish economy had to undergo.
The need for changes in the modes of operation of monetary policy was brought into stark 
contrast by the worsening of the financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. This put the advanced countries on course for a deep recession and called for 
emergency policies to stabilise the financial strains and mitigate their pass-through to real 
activity and employment. In particular, demand expansions were needed to counter the 
collapse of confidence and strongly contractionary spending developments. In this 
situation, the ECB started by immediately cutting interest rates by 100 basis points (bp), 
the first of seven successive reductions between October 2008 and May 2009, which 
reduced interest rates by a total of 325 bp. These rate cuts were accompanied by a very 
significant change to the ECB’s liquidity tender system: the switch from a variable rate 
tender procedure with limited satisfaction of applications to one based on a fixed rate with 
full allotment of the amounts demanded. This important change involved the renunciation 
of any control over the amount of liquidity and the complete substitution of the interbank 
market in its intermediation role, which it had stopped playing owing to its deep paralysis. 
At the same time, the maturities at which the liquidity was supplied were extended to six 
months, and the amounts assigned and the numbers of tenders of medium-term liquidity 
were considerably increased. Liquidity was even offered in currencies other than the euro 
to satisfy the needs of some European banks for US dollars and Swiss Francs. Finally, the 
requirements for assets to be eligible as collateral for Eurosystem funds were loosened, on 
an exceptional basis, while the financial tensions continued.
These emergency ECB actions were especially appropriate for the needs of the Spanish 
economy, where the sudden change in the international economic climate was threatening 
The influence of ECB 
action on the Spanish 
economy during the crisis
THE GREAT RECESSION
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to transform the cyclical slowdown into a sharp loss of confidence and an abrupt 
contraction in spending. The intensity of the Great Recession in Spain was no greater than 
in other European countries, but the size of the imbalances that had built up in the 
immediate past and the lack of structural adaptation in some parts of the economy to 
the requirements for integration into the Monetary Union made the incubation of deeper 
problems likely. Such was the case, most notably, of the developments in the real-estate 
market. The possibilities for a smooth adjustment of the overvaluation and overproduction 
of housing suddenly evaporated as the market launched into a sharp correction of unknown 
extent, leading the Spanish economy for the first time in recent history to experience the 
bursting of a real-estate bubble. Given its high exposure to real-estate risk and its great 
dependence on wholesale funding on international financial markets, the stability of a 
significant segment of the banking system was seriously eroded as a result. To complicate 
the situation further, the problems were concentrated among savings banks, most of which 
were affected. Owing to the lack of definition of their ownership regime and the political 
interference in their governance, they lacked the necessary capacity to adapt to such 
adverse circumstances. The weakening of the financial system threatened to increase the 
financial fragility of the Spanish economy since, given the high levels of corporate and 
household debt, the ability to cover its financial needs abroad depended substantially on 
the perception of the solidity of financial intermediaries, which channelled the flows of 
foreign savings to domestic agents. The worsening of the international financial crisis and 
the Great Recession had hit the Achilles heel of a growth model that had already been 
shown to be unsustainable. Monetary and financial conditions had tightened significantly, 
contrary to the specific requirements of the Spanish economy in that situation. The action 
of the ECB was aimed at relieving this tension, although the problems that had emerged 
extended far beyond the scope of monetary policy. The new tender systems proved very 
helpful in avoiding the strangulation of Spanish credit institutions, and the loosening of 
collateral eligibility requirements was also very beneficial. The ECB’s decision to launch a 
programme for the purchase of covered bonds, such as cédulas hipotecarias, was 
particularly directed at facilitating the transmission of its expansionary policy towards 
those segments of the European banking system, such as the Spanish one, that were 
most affected by the paralysis of the wholesale financing markets. In any case, the 
weakening of the banking system prevented the relaxation of monetary conditions 
engineered by the ECB from being adequately transmitted to the Spanish economy, and 
what began as a cyclical adjustment of credit growth turned into a rapid, sharp contraction 
in the amount of credit available. From competing to expand their balance sheets, the 
institutions had switched to reducing their high levels of exposure and leverage, and this 
was compounded by the need to restructure those savings banks that had begun to 
experience solvency problems.
The specific financial difficulties of the Spanish economy were heightened by the 
emergence of latent structural problems in the labour market. The lack of sensitivity of 
wages to the cyclical situation proved disastrous for absorption of the serious shock 
suffered. In 2009, when the economy contracted by 3.7%, wage compensation grew by 
around 4%. In conjunction with the sharp real-estate contraction, this led to rapid job 
destruction and a pronounced increase in unemployment, which not only eroded the 
foundations of domestic demand, but also damaged the perception of the Spanish 
economy abroad.
At the same time, the leeway available for expansionary fiscal measures to mitigate 
the serious weakening of the private propensity to spend was much more limited than 
the favourable values of general government aggregates appeared to imply. Although 
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the budget was in surplus to the tune of 2% of GDP, and public debt was 35% of GDP, 
well below the average euro area level, a significant part of government revenues came 
from the excess spending in the real-estate sector and on other activities that would 
prove to be unsustainable. Notwithstanding this, Spain put itself at the head of the 
advanced countries in the resort to fiscal stimuli. However, following the recommendations 
of international agencies in this regard did not sufficiently take into account the structural 
weakness underlying the public finances. Within two years the fiscal position had 
deteriorated by more than 13 GDP percentage points and a dynamic of sharply rising 
public debt had been set in motion, increasing the financial vulnerability of the Spanish 
economy to external shocks [Malo de Molina (2009)]. As a result, the expansionary 
monetary policies applied by the ECB in response to the Great Recession were barely felt 
by the Spanish economy, where financial pressures and the contraction in lending 
increased, with an intensification of their restrictive impact on spending, activity and 
employment.
In the euro area, the Great Recession gave way in 2010 to the resumption of modest 
growth, reflecting a favourable response to the monetary and fiscal stimuli introduced. 
However, the reaction was not uniform, because the severe shock had revealed hidden 
vulnerabilities in certain periphery countries that had failed to adjust fully to the 
requirements of monetary integration and internal imbalances that continued to exist 
within the euro area. These eventually emerged in the form of the “sovereign debt crisis”, 
which precipitated a double-dip recession and threatened the very survival of the single 
currency in the form it was created, posing challenges to the ECB’s capacity to act of 
unusual transcendence.
The sovereign debt crisis involved the sudden emergence of numerous imbalances and 
misalignments that had been building up, with varying degrees of severity, across a 
broad group of countries of the area. In order of importance, these included ongoing 
competitiveness losses, oversized financial systems heavily exposed to real-estate 
risks, high levels of debt and public finance fragilities that emerged as a consequence of 
the deficits incurred during the crisis and the financial assistance needed to contain the 
financial system instability. The conjunction of these phenomena, which exposed the 
inadequacies of the institutional framework for economic governance and the lack of 
instruments to address the systemic shocks that threatened the very stability of the euro 
area, resulted in a lack of confidence in the ability of some of these economies to guarantee 
the sustainability of their debts and in the ability of the euro area authorities to resolve the 
situation. The result was a drastic increase in sovereign risk spreads, reflecting a bet by the 
markets that some of these Member States would be unable to cover their financing 
requirements without some kind of external assistance or bailout. The process started with 
the crisis and bailout of Greece, soon spreading to Ireland and Portugal. Within little more 
than a year there was a serious possibility that this dynamic might even extend to Italy and 
Spain, overwhelming the authorities’ capacity to react, with the consequent risk of break-
up of the euro and a currency redenomination in the most severely affected countries. As 
a result of the sovereign debt crisis, the situation changed from one of markets that were 
manifestly incapable of distinguishing between sovereign, bank and corporate risks, to 
excessive discrimination, market disintegration, renationalisation of financial flows and 
fragmentation of monetary policy transmission.
In particular, this financial fragmentation proved to be fertile ground for the development of 
dangerous vicious circles. Sovereign and bank risk tensions fed off each other, making it 
impossible for certain governments to bail out and shore up vulnerable banks without 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
AND THE DOUBLE-DIP 
RECESSION
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, FEBRUARY 2014 ECB ACTION AND THE SPANISH ECONOMY DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE EURO
jeopardising the sustainability of their own finances, while simultaneously increasing the 
risk of banks as a consequence of the perceived weakness of their sovereign’s financial 
situation, regardless of the solvency of the banks themselves [Gual (2013)].
This is not the place to analyse this process and the nature of the review of the institutional 
framework of EMU to which it has given rise [Sapir and Wolff (2013), Millaruelo and Del Río 
(2013)]. What is appropriate here is to consider the challenges it entailed for ECB action 
and the repercussions of such action on the Spanish economy.
The great financial crisis of the 21st century has posed significant challenges for all central 
banks, calling into question the validity of the anti-inflationary paradigm that had held 
sway since the mid-1970s. However, it is the ECB that has had to face the greatest 
complications, stemming from the exceptional nature of its single monetary policy, 
conducted in a large area made up of various countries that retain sovereignty over other 
spheres of economic policy. Nor has the ECB had the benefit of a lengthy track record, 
having existed for little more than a decade when the sovereign debt crisis broke.
The sovereign debt crisis and the doubts regarding the survival of the euro in its current 
form called for ECB action on a broad range of fronts. In response to the resurgent 
contractionary forces that aborted the recovery and triggered the double-dip recession the 
expansionary monetary policy stance needed to be intensified. And this had to be done 
within a complex territory delimited by proximity to the zero lower bound and by the 
dampening or nullifying impact of the instability itself on the effectiveness of expansionary 
impulses, as evident in the contractionary dynamic of lending. Also, there was an urgent 
need to contain the forces destabilising the euro area, curbing the disintegration and 
renationalisation of markets and re-establishing the effectiveness of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Effective ECB action on the numerous and complex fronts that 
had opened up required the use of a broad repertoire of innovatory, standard and, especially, 
non-standard monetary policy measures [Lenza et al. (2010); Woodford (2012); Cour-Thimann 
and Reinhart  (2013)]. This was an unexplored area, peppered with the complications 
inherent in the ECB’s unique status as the central bank of 17 sovereign states (now 18, with 
Latvia) and the difficulties of delimiting the monetary responsibilities of actions with fiscal 
implications. And this action was needed just when the shortcomings of the institutional 
framework had been revealed and a far-reaching review of the latter had been commenced, 
in the midst of significant controversies over contrasting approaches to the steps needed 
for progress towards fuller and more coherent integration [Basu and Stiglitz (2013); De 
Grauwe (2013); Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013); Darvas (2013)].
The standard measures included further reductions in official interest rates, as the impact 
of weaker growth prospects and the entry into a scenario of inflation persistently below the 
price stability definition became evident. These developments did not entail a high risk of 
deflation, but they clearly posed obstacles to the relative-price and competitiveness 
adjustment required for the internal imbalances to be absorbed. The main refinancing rate 
was reduced as low as 0.25% in November 2013, while the deposit facility rate was held 
at 0%, narrowing the corridor between the credit and deposit facility rates, and even 
making it asymmetric. The ECB also announced, in this respect, that it was prepared to 
apply negative rates to the deposit facility if the risks to stability so required. This set of 
standard actions amounted to a maximum expansionary monetary stance, which was 
supplemented by additional actions in the area of liquidity providing arrangements, with 
further extensions to maturities (to three years, to address the uncertainty over liquidity 
access that sovereign or banking system problems may cause) and the adoption of 
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guidelines on the future behaviour of the tender system and on the continuation of the low 
interest-rate policy. The ECB announced that the system of providing unlimited amounts 
of liquidity at a fixed rate would remain in force for a long time and promised to keep 
interest rates low, or even lower, for a prolonged period (see Table 1).
The most complex area was the ECB’s intervention in securities markets to repair the 
damage caused to the monetary policy transmission channel by the sovereign debt crisis. 
Securities purchases were activated in 2009 to boost the markets for covered bonds, such 
as cédulas, and to stimulate lending to the private sector. The sovereign debt crisis gave 
rise to a need to counter the expectations spreading through the markets, that threatened 
to become self-fulfilling, regarding default on the debts of some sovereigns and even, 
subsequently, of the redenomination of sovereign debt, following a country’s abandonment 
of or expulsion from the euro area.
In May 2010, when the Greek crisis and its spread to other potentially vulnerable countries 
had reached a critical point and a bailout for Greece had been agreed, the ECB, given the 
lack of agreement to establish an inter-governmental or European mechanism for debt 
market intervention, decided to approve the securities market programme (SMP). This 
consisted of secondary market purchases of the public debt of countries suffering speculative 
attacks on the bond markets. The exclusive aim of this monetary policy operation was to 
ensure the transmission of monetary impulses to countries facing exorbitant borrowing 
costs and difficulty obtaining financing owing to the uncertainty regarding their solvency. 
Their monetary nature limited the scope of these operations and made them conditional 
upon the adoption of necessary measures both by the authorities of the countries concerned 
and by the European authorities to ensure the sustainability of their public finances and the 
improvement of the governance of the area. Under no circumstances could the ECB 
surreptitiously carry out the mutualisation of risks that the fiscal authorities or national 
parliaments were not prepared to assume. Even so, the ECB’s performance of this type of 
operations led to criticism in the public opinion of some countries, and even public differences 
between members of the ECB’s Governing Council. This programme had two phases: the 
first, in 2010, was focused on the bailouts of the Greek, Irish and Portuguese economies; 
and the second, in summer 2011 concentrated more on Italy and Spain, when the risks for 
these economies of contagion began to become more imminent.
The most critical moment came in summer 2012. The doubts over the Spanish economy had 
been intensified by the release of high budget deficit figures and the escalation of the banking 
crisis following the nationalisation of Bankia and the announcement of a European financial 
assistance programme for the recapitalisation of Spanish banks. The political uncertainties 
in Italy overshadowed the possibilities of progress with the necessary adjustment and the 
eventuality that Greece might abandon the euro raised the risk of redenomination to 
unprecedented levels. The ECB’s response was unequivocal. The President announced that 
it would, within its mandate, do whatever was necessary to save the euro. This announcement 
was followed by the design of the new Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Programme, 
under which the ECB can purchase unlimited amounts of the public debt of countries 
vulnerable to the sovereign debt crisis, when they suffer pressures that are not justified by 
the developments in their fundamentals. The programme is designed for countries that 
maintain the capacity to finance themselves on the markets and submit themselves to the 
conditionality of the EU precautionary support programmes, to ensure that their economic 
policies are consistent with correction of their imbalances. This new instrument is basically 
capable of deterring speculative processes and it is designed to limit the assumption of risks 
by the Eurosystem, avoiding a permanent presence in the markets.
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3.75% (b) (b) 0.75% (b)
100 bp 200 bp
MRO
6-month LTROs 6-month LTROs
1-year LTROs 1-year LTROs
3-year VLTROs
USD USD
CHF
CBPP1 (€60 bn) (c) CBPP2 (€40 bn) (c)
Liquidity
Interest rates
1% 1%
Forward guidance
Currency operations
Securities purchase programmes: covered bond purchase programmes (CBPP1 and CBPP2), Securities Markets Programme (SMP) and Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme
SMP (c)
OMTs
Reserve requirements
2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Additional 3-month LTROs Rollover at a ?xed rate with full allotment
Standing facilities: rate corridor width
Weekly ordinary operations (MROs) and longer-term operations (LTROs)
150 bp 100 bp 75 bp
liquidity > benchmark neutral Fixed rate with full allotment
3-month LTROs Fixed rate with full allotment Fixed rate with full allotment
Supplementary LTROs. At a ?xed rate and with full allotment since October 2008
Special LTROs with a maturity of one maintenance period
2013
MRO interest rate
4% 4.25% 1% 1.25% 1% 0.5% 0.25%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
CHRONOLOGY OF EUROSYSTEM MEASURES (a) TABLE 1 
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a The colour red indicates that the operations in question were carried out during that month, while blue indicates that although no new operations were carried out that month, the liquidity provided by previous operations remained 
outstanding. The OMT programme is available, but no debt purchases have been made since it was initiated.
b Between October 2008 and May 2009 the ECB reduced interest rates on seven occasions, by a total of 325 bp. In November and December 2011 the ECB reduced interest rates twice, by a total of 50 bp.
c CBPP1 ended in June 2010, the outstanding amount peaking at €61.1 billion. CBPP2 ended in November 2012, the outstanding amount peaking at €16.4 billion, well below the programmed amount of €40 billion. The SMP 
peaked at an outstanding amount of €219.3 billion in February 2012.
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Along with the steps taken by European political authorities to establish a banking union 
and the progress made with fiscal consolidation and structural reform at the country level, 
these ECB actions marked a turning point in the development of the sovereign debt crisis, 
since they were interpreted by the markets as sufficiently effective protection against the 
extreme (tail) risks of a euro break-up. The exponential growth of sovereign risks subsided 
and the tendency for markets to fragment began to ease, although the return to normal 
was still a long way off and not without risks of setbacks and resurgence of instability.
All these actions had an especially favourable impact in the case of the Spanish economy 
which, following the bailouts for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, had stood, along with Italy, 
on the front line of the crisis. Interest rate reductions helped to ease the extremely adverse 
financial conditions to which the economy had become subject but, since the monetary 
policy transmission process was not fully repaired, these declines did not lead to any 
easing in the financing conditions of Spanish firms and households or to any improvement 
in the credit conditions offered by the banking system, which was undergoing a far-
reaching restructuring and recapitalisation process.
The most visible part of the effectiveness of the ECB action was evident during the period 
from summer 2011 to summer 2012. That was when the expectations that the Spanish 
economy might, together with the Italian economy, eventually require a bailout programme 
of a magnitude difficult for the current structures of the Monetary Union to handle and the 
dangers of a Greek exit from the euro were at their greatest.
In the summer of 2011, reactivation of the securities market programme, with the focus on 
Italy and Spain, served, along with the economic policy measures adopted in these two 
countries, to halt and turn around the rise in sovereign risks. Nonetheless, the persistence 
of the uncertainty was evident in the inability of the Spanish economy to roll over significant 
amounts of debt held by non-residents, which led to increasing dependence of Spanish 
credit institutions on Eurosystem financing. The ECB’s decision to embark on further 
massive injections of three-year liquidity was decisive in avoiding a financial collapse in 
the Spanish economy. As can be seen in Chart 2, during the year that ended in summer 
2012 there was a net financial outflow of €300 billion of funds, which could only be covered 
by means of an increase in Eurosystem financing, to a total of €400 billion. Most of this 
financing came from special tenders of three-year funds which, apart from effectively 
substituting for the total absence of market financing, helped eliminate the uncertainty 
regarding the possibility that the evaporation of external financing might end up choking 
off any possibility of early emergence from the double-dip recession, which in Spain 
threatened to be more intense and persistent than in the euro area as a whole. The 
Monetary Union functioned correctly, financing the acute balance of payments crisis 
suffered by the Spanish economy as a result of the conjunction of high external 
indebtedness and market distrust, exacerbated by the frailties of the banking system 
revealed by the banking crisis and by the need to resort to a programme of assistance to 
recapitalise the banks. Eurosystem financing was only a temporary solution. That a growing 
part of Spain’s external debt should end up on the balance sheet of Eurosystem central 
banks through Target account balances would be inconceivable. In fact, there was harsh 
criticism in some countries, based on misguided analyses, directed at the risks for borrower 
countries that Target balances represented.
As a result, the sovereign risk of Spain continued to grow, reaching 630 bp, very close to 
the level at which other Treasuries lost access to the markets and had to request a bailout. 
The situation of the Spanish economy would only start to stabilise when the ECB adopted 
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its most decisive action to ensure the stability of the euro, i.e. the announcement and 
design of OMTs. From that moment risk spreads began to return towards less distorted 
levels, reaching by end-2013 their pre-summer 2011 levels. The recovery in confidence 
and the decline in risk enabled external financing to resume and dependence on 
Eurosystem financing to be progressively reduced to half its peak level.
The action taken by the ECB to combat the sovereign debt crisis and to ensure the survival 
of the euro has been especially effective in helping to avoid the financial strangulation of 
the Spanish economy and to facilitate its continued participation in the Monetary Union, 
without the need for a bailout. That said, the ECB’s capacity to act is limited and resolution 
of the underlying problems ultimately depends on the strength of the Monetary Union’s 
institutional framework and the ability of national economic policy to correct imbalances 
and lay the foundations for a new growth path.
Many problems remain to be resolved, including the re-establishment of homogeneous 
monetary policy transmission and repair of the short circuit between sovereign risk and 
bank risk. Both issues are fundamental for credit to flow normally to businesses and 
households when the recovery begins to take hold, and they, in turn, depend on the success 
of the ambitious banking union project. The ECB has a key role to play here, although its 
capacity to act is again limited, since it can be no substitute for the necessary fiscal 
contribution from the member countries that has still to be determined [Coeuré (2013)].
10.2.2014.
Final considerations
SOURCES: Reuters and Banco de España. 
FINANCING OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY CHART 2
-80 
-60 
-40 
-20 
0 
20 
40 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
€ bn 
NET FLOW OF FINANCING, EXCLUDING THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
450 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
€ bn 
EUROSYSTEM BALANCE SHEET 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, FEBRUARY 2014 ECB ACTION AND THE SPANISH ECONOMY DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE EURO
BANCO DE ESPAÑA (2006). Annual Report, 2005, p. 30.
BASU, K., and E. STIGLITZ (2013). International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability. An Economic Theory 
Model for Amending the Treaty of Lisbon, Policy Research Working Paper 6555, World Bank, August, Washington.
COEURÉ, B. (2013). “El mecanismo único de resolución: por qué se necesita”, Papeles de Economía Española, 
No 137, November, Madrid.
COUR-THIMANN, P., and V. R. REINHART (2013). The ECB’S Non-standard Monetary Policy Measures. The Role of 
Institutional Factors and Financial Structure, European Central Bank, Working Paper No 1528, Frankfurt.
DARVAS, Z. (2013). The Euro Area’s Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain, Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, September, Brussels.
DE GRAUWE, P. (2013). “The Political Economy of the Euro”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.16, pp. 153-170.
FURCERI, D., and A. ZDZIENICKA (2013). The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing 
Mechanism, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No 128.
GUAL, J. (2013). “Unión bancaria: ¿de hormigón o de paja?”, Papeles de Economía Española, No 137, November, 
Madrid.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2013). Unconventional Monetary Policies - Recent Experience and Prospects, 
April.
LENZA, M., H. PILL and L. REICHLIN (2010). Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times, European Central Bank, Working 
Paper No 1253, Frankfurt.
MALO DE MOLINA, J. L. (2006). “La financiación del auge de la economía española”, Economistas, No 108, March, 
p. 25, Madrid.
—(2007). Los principales rasgos y experiencias de la integración de la economía española en la UEM, Occasional 
Papers, No 0701, February, p. 27, Banco de España.
—(2009). “The challenges the international financial crisis poses for the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, April, 
Banco de España.
MILLARUELO, A., and A. DEL RÍO (2013). “La fragmentación en la zona del euro durante la crisis”, Boletín 
Económico, December, Banco de España.
SAPIR, A., and G. B WOLFF (2013). The Neglected Side of Banking Union: Reshaping Europe’s. Financial System, 
Bruegel Policy Contribution, Brussels.
WOODFORD, M. (2012). “Methods of P olicy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound”, 2012 FRB Kansas 
City Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, WY.
REFERENCES

